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Much has been discussed concerning apriority and its relation to the concept of 
necessity. Many philosophers have conventionally supposed that a proposition is 
known a priori only if it is necessarily true. According to Kant, for instance, the first 
philosopher who systematically discussed apriority, “necessity” is one of the criteria 
of a priori knowledge. Kant (1958) maintains that all a priori knowledge is necessarily
true.  Thus, from this conventional thought, many philosophers claim that apriority 
involves necessity, and rejecting the concept of necessity unavoidably affects the 
status of apriority. That is, if all a priori propositions need to be necessarily true, and 
we can prove that there is no necessarily true proposition, we are forced to conclude 
that there are no a priori propositions. However, this paper aims to propose that 
apriority does not involve necessity since all a priori propositions need not be 
necessarily true. The paper has been separated into three parts. Firstly, I will discuss 
the problem of necessity and its effect on the status of apriority. Secondly, I will argue
that apriority does not involve necessity by considering the two following questions: 
(A) is there a necessary a posteriori proposition? And (B) is there a contingent a priori
proposition?  Thirdly, I will scrutinize the possible objections and try to defend my 
argument which will involve some further considerations about a priori justification.
2I
In this section, I would like to discuss the problem of necessity and its effect on the 
status of apriority. I will investigate the approach of philosophers for whom apriority involves
necessity, which leads them to assert that refuting the concept of necessity is a good ground 
for refuting the possibility of apriority.
W. V. Quine’s argument against the concept of necessity (1951) is widely taken to 
imply a refutation of the concept of apriority. For Quine, our beliefs are linked to one another
in a vast network, which he called the “web of beliefs.” In this web of beliefs, some beliefs 
are nearer to the edge and some are nearer to the center. Perceptual beliefs are nearer to the 
edge in that they are linked very much to experience and comparatively little to other beliefs. 
These beliefs are fairly easy to change if they are given new evidence. Other beliefs are 
nearer to the center in that they are linked very much to other beliefs and only very indirectly,
through long chains of other beliefs, to perception. Logical truths, for example, are simply 
beliefs that lie at or close to the center. The beliefs at the edge of the web are more open to 
change than the beliefs in the center. An unexpected observation can prompt us to make a 
great variety of possible changes to the web. According to Quine, no statement is immune to 
revision. Since no statement is immune to revision, and a priori knowledge is by Kant’s 
definition necessarily true, then it seems to follow that although Quine does not explicitly 
reject a priori knowledge, his arguments imply a repudiation of it. Hilary Putnam (1976) and 
Phillip Kitcher (1983) are the examples of philosophers who take Quine’s argument as a 
challenge to the concept of apriority. 
However, in the next section, I will maintain that refuting the concept of necessity is 
not a good ground for refuting a priori knowledge since apriority does not involve necessity. 
3II
In this section, I would like to argue that apriority does not involve necessity since 
there are contingent a priori propositions. My objective in this section is to debate two 
important questions: (A) is there a necessary a posteriori proposition? And (B) is there a 
contingent a priori proposition? 
Are there Necessary a posteriori Propositions?
Recent interest concerning necessary a posteriori propositions is due mostly to the 
influence of Kripke whose argument claims that the concept of apriority and necessity are 
different and are not interchangeable. In this section, I will try to answer the question (A) and
ultimately sum up that the examples of necessary a posteriori proposition can be surmised.  In
order to demonstrate this, I will first discuss Kripke’s examples of necessary a posteriori 
propositions. Then, I will discuss the status of laws of nature, which are commonly believed 
in being examples of necessary a posteriori propositions. My aim in this section is to 
conclude that the typical examples of necessary a posteriori proposition can be surmised. 
In explaining why apriority is not equivalent to necessity, Kripke (1980) introduces 
the example of Goldbach’s conjecture as a case in which the equivalence between them may 
collapse. Presumably, since so far there has been no proof or disproof of the conjecture, there 
is no a priori knowledge of it. As a result, here we have a case of a proposition which is either
necessarily true or false, but is not a priori in any meaningful sense.
The examples which Kripke uses to prove the existence of the necessary a posteriori 
propositions are the propositions which show empirical identity such as “Hesperus is 
Phosphorus,” and the propositions about the essence of things such as “Gold is the element 
with atomic number 79”. Kripke explicates that when “Hesperus” (which is the planet Venus 
4in the evening) and “Phosphorus” (which is the planet Venus in the morning) are used as 
names, they refer in all possible worlds to the planet Venus.  As a consequence, names are 
rigid designators; expressions that designate the same things with respect to every world in 
which those things exist, and which designate nothing in all the other possible worlds in 
which those things do not exist. Then, regarding to the propositions about the essence of 
things, Kripke claims that “material origins” are the essence of things. According to his 
thought, it is impossible for anything to be made from any substance but the one of which it 
actually made. He declares that “How could a person originating from different parents, from 
an entirely different sperm and egg, be this very woman?” Thus, from his account of 
essentialism, he confirms that the propositions which demonstrate the essence of things are 
necessarily true propositions. Moreover, Kripke supposes that we require experience to know 
the essence of things. For example, “Gold is the element with the atomic number 79,” we can 
know gold’s essence from our experience and we also do not say “gold” of such a thing 
which has all appearances we initially use to identify gold but does not have the element with
the atomic number 79. According to Kripke, the propositions regarding essence are necessary
a posteriori propositions. Therefore, “apriority” and “necessity” are not the equivalent 
concepts which can be interchanged everywhere without changing their meanings. 
However, I maintain that Kripke’s examples of necessary a posteriori proposition are 
confronted with two important problems.
Firstly, if I do not only accept name as referring to expressions, but also accept name 
as descriptive expressions (for instance, “Phosphorus” does not only refer to the planet 
Venus, but also has a descriptive meaning such as “the planet which we can see in the 
morning,” and “Hesperus” does not only refer to the planet Venus, but also has a descriptive 
meaning such as “the planet which we can see in the evening,”) then how can we confirm that
Phosphorus is Hesperus? That is, after considering two terms’ descriptive meaning, 
5“Phosphorus” is different from “Hesperus.” Therefore, it seems that, if we accept name in 
this way, besides name as referring to expressions, Kripke’s example of necessary a 
posteriori proposition is suddenly problematic.
It may be objected that Kripke actually disagrees with the idea of names as being 
descriptive expressions since the descriptive meaning causes us not to think about the other 
possible situations of the name. That is, if we accept name as descriptive meaning, a 
proposition which contains name and its description is analytic, and its truth value is 
tautology which cannot be false. But Kripke maintains that such propositions are only 
contingently true, which therefore can be false.  Therefore, according to Kripke, name is an 
expression which only purports to designate particular individuals. Nevertheless, I do not 
think that a proposition which contains name and its description is tautology. That is, we can 
give some descriptive meaning to a name. But later we find that the descriptive meaning is 
wrong and then change the description to the new one. A proposition which contains names 
and their descriptions is evidently not a tautology. Thus, I am not in agreement with Kripke in
rejecting names as being descriptive expressions, and when we use names as descriptive 
expressions, we cannot accept the proposition which presents empirical identity as the 
examples of necessary a posteriori propositions.
Secondly, there are many philosophers who contest Kripke’s proposition of essence. 
Michael Della Rocca (2002), for example, notices that Kripke’s essentialism is self-defeating 
since his essentialism primarily assumes the necessity of identity. Contrarily, identity also 
assumes essentialism. So, Kripke’s argument is circular and should be discarded. Likewise, in
my opinion, Kripke’s essentialism presupposes some a priori basic idea which precedes the 
judgment that we cannot clearly confirm that essential propositions are necessary a posteriori 
propositions. “The table is not made from ice”, for instance, is a necessary a posteriori 
proposition if and only if we assume that “Any objects cannot be made from other materials 
6which are not its material origin” (The assumption is the core idea of origin essentialism). 
Then, when we consider whether this assumption is an a priori or a posteriori proposition, we 
can see that the proposition cannot be a posteriori since it speaks of all objects in general but 
we cannot experience all objects in order to conclude the above assumption. However, in 
reply, someone may suggest that the assumption is a posteriori and is true because of 
inductive reasoning. Nevertheless, it can be asked again whether a justification of inductive 
reasoning is a priori or a posteriori. But, the justification of inductive reasoning cannot be a 
posteriori justification since the argument will be circular. That is, when we answer the 
question "why the past can explain the future?" with the answer that "in the past, we could 
explain the future using the inductive reasoning," such an answer is highly problematic since 
it uses the conclusion within its premise. On the other hand, when the justification of 
inductive reasoning is a priori, it seems to follow that the propositions concerning essence are
possible if and only if some a priori proposition is primarily assumed to be true. Therefore, 
we cannot claim that the propositions concerning essence are necessary a posteriori 
propositions.
Then, let us now consider the laws of nature, which seem to be necessary a posteriori 
propositions. Many thinkers claim that the laws of nature are a posteriori propositions. Law 
necessitarianism, for instance, claims that everything that happens is necessitated. That is, 
what happens in the world is determined or necessitated by the essence of things or by 
general laws, so necessity and possibility are the objective notions. The important point is we 
justify most laws of nature by experience. Thus, most laws of nature seem to be necessary a 
posteriori propositions.  However, I will finally suggest that the laws of nature are not the 
examples of necessary a posteriori propositions. They are just “scientific hypotheses” which 
are fallible.
7The laws of nature are usually defined as uniformities or regularities that hold 
throughout the universe, at all places and all times. Nathan Salmon (1992) maintains that the 
characteristics of the laws of nature are as follows: 
- The laws of nature are universal statements which refer to all things in the domain
of what the law says. 
- The laws of nature are true statements. 
- The laws of nature have to sustain counterfactual inferences. 
The above three characterizations lead me to wonder about the justification of laws. 
The laws of nature can be the regularities that hold throughout the universe at all places and 
all times if and only if we can justify laws of nature. And most of the laws are justified by 
inductive reasoning. So, if we justify inductive reasoning, we can justify most of the laws of 
nature. However, as I have already pointed out, the justification of inductive reasoning is still 
problematic.  
Then, the laws of nature as the regularities that hold throughout the universe at all 
places and all times cause one to question how they can really be possible. That is, what we 
examine from our experience is in limited time. We cannot observe anything in all places and
all times. Furthermore, human beings, as living beings, which have their own limitations, 
cannot see both what is too small and what is too big for them. Thus, we can never be certain 
of the truth of any scientific laws and we cannot identify the regularities which human being 
observes as the “laws” of nature. However, what I argue does not imply that there is nothing 
which functions as an explainer of the phenomena. From my own perspective, all laws of 
nature are just “scientific hypotheses” which can be defeated when there are other hypotheses
that can better explain the phenomenon. Therefore, I do not agree on insisting the laws of 
nature are examples of necessary a posteriori propositions. 
8In conclusion, I cannot prove that there is a necessary a posteriori proposition since 
the typical examples of the proposition are suspect. It denotes that I give a negative answer to
question (A). However, I cannot conclude whether apriority involves necessity only from 
considering question (A) for there is question (B) which if I can positively answer, I can 
strongly prove that apriority does not involve necessity. 
Are there Contingent a priori Propositions?
In order to verify that there is a contingent a priori proposition, I will scrutinize 
Kripke’s examples of contingent a priori propositions and his contention that his examples 
prove the existence of the contingent a priori propositions. Moreover, in this section, I will 
discuss about the unique feature of the typical examples of a priori propositions, such as 
geometry, arithmetic and logic, which is one of the reasons that make many thinkers believe 
that apriority involves necessity. Eventually, I will argue that if the propositions in geometry, 
arithmetic and logic are the examples of a priori proposition, they are contingently true.
In maintaining that there are contingent a priori propositions, Kripke (1971) describes 
that propositions which contain the terms that fix the reference of the terms are the contingent
a priori propositions. For instance, “Stick S is one meter long at t0”. In order to know that 
stick S is one meter long at t0, we have to use “stick S” to fix or refer to one meter long. 
Kripke claims that we have a priori knowledge that stick S is one meter long. Nevertheless, 
“Stick S is one meter long” is not necessarily true, but contingently true, for “stick S” may 
not be one meter long as a result of heating or cooling. Kripke states that there is a difference 
between “one meter” and “stick S’s length at t0”, that is “one meter” is a rigid designator 
which designates a certain length in all possible worlds but “stick S’s length at t0” is not a 
rigid designator since stick S’s length can be changed because of heating or cooling. “Stick S 
9is one meter long at t0,” then, is not necessarily true. Therefore, Kripke maintains that there 
are contingent a priori propositions. 
However, Keith Donnellan (1997) claims that Kripke’s examples of contingent a 
priori proposition are just an uninteresting kind of meta-linguistic knowledge. According to 
Donnellan, supposing that Leverrier introduces the name “Neptune” to rigidly designate the 
cause of such-and-such perturbations, saying, “Neptune is the cause of such-and such 
perturbations.” The sentence he utters expresses a truth. And perhaps Leverrier knows that 
the sentence he utters expresses a truth. But, for Donnellan, Leverrier does not know the truth
that the sentence expresses.  Donnellan provides an example of his thought by supposing that,
today we rigidly baptize as ‘Newman’ the first person that will be born in the XXIInd century. 
Now we have no idea of who this person will be, although we assume that there will be one. 
But suppose that one hundred years from now we meet this person, who was in fact baptized 
‘John’ by his parents. In this case, as Donnellan argues, it seems quite strange to tell him ‘I 
knew one hundred years ago that you would be the first person born in the XXIInd century, 
and that your name would be “Newman”’. The reason why this is so strange is, according to 
Donnellan, that we have never had, before his birth, real knowledge (besides trivial meta-
linguistic knowledge) corresponding to ‘Newman is the first person born in the XXIInd 
century’. It is Donnellan’s contention that someone who knows only the reference-fixing 
definition does not understand the term in the statement nor sentence containing it. According
to Donnellan, to comprehend the name, one must know of some object that is the reference of
the name, when such knowledge of an object requires a causal connection with it. Thus, 
Kripke’s examples of contingent a priori proposition are just a trivial and uninteresting kind 
of meta-linguistic knowledge. 
Donnellan’s critique of Kripke’s contingent a priori propositions has had a great 
impact on discussions about the contingent a priori propositions. Nevertheless, I do not agree 
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with Donnellan’s analysis. It seems that Donnellan’s example is an example which tries to 
persuade us to see that contingent a priori propositions were just a trivial and uninteresting 
kind of meta-linguistic knowledge. That is, it is a naming of what will happen in the future, 
and when the future comes, the discovery that the thing is not named as previously intended. 
But I maintain that there exist contingent a priori propositions which are not just a trivial and 
uninteresting kind of meta-linguistic knowledge. The example I wish to give is the case of 
tropical cyclone naming. Presently, most tropical cyclones are given a name using one of 
several lists of tropical cyclone names. Tropical Cyclones north of the Equator between the 
International Dateline and 100°E are named from the lists, once they reach Tropical Storm 
status. Each of the 14 nations or territories which are members of the ESCAP/WMO 
Typhoon Committee submit 10 names in their languages, which are used in alphabetical 
order. Each year, the names of particularly destructive storms (if there are any) are "retired" 
and new names are chosen to take their place. We can see that the proposition concerning the 
tropical cyclone naming is in the form of “name is definite description”. A tropical cyclone is
named with the new name after the last retired name. For example, Jebi is a tropical cyclone 
after Cimeron. The advantage of this naming process is to allow for easier communication. 
We can universally refer to a tropical cyclone without giving any definite description, such as
“the tropical cyclone which heavily damaged the south of Vietnam in 2005”. 
It is significant that the propositions from tropical cyclone naming, such as Jebi is a 
tropical cyclone after Cimeron, are the contingent a priori propositions. They are 
contingently true since their truth comes from the naming process of ESCAP/WMO Typhoon
Committee, and there can have been other possible worlds where the naming process could 
have been different. And they are a priori propositions since they are nonexperientially 
justified. We can see that tropical cyclone naming differs from Donnellan’s Newman in two 
respects. First of all, tropical cyclone naming is naming what will happen in a future which is 
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“universally recognized”. But Donnellan’s Newman is a naming to refer to someone who 
satisfies a definite description, which is not universally recognized. Secondly, as a result of 
the first difference, when the tropical cyclone occurs, it will be named with the name that is 
previously planned. But, according to Donnellan’s Newman, someone who is the first person 
born in the XXIInd century might not be named “Newman” which was previously intended, 
but might be baptized “John” by his parents. The important point of tropical cyclone naming 
reveals that the contingent a priori propositions exist. Furthermore, the contingent a priori 
propositions are not just trivial and uninteresting kinds of meta-linguistic knowledge as 
Donnellan claims. They are a useful kind of knowledge that allows us to communicate more 
conveniently.
After considering Kripke’s examples of contingent a priori proposition, now I will 
turn my attention to a unique feature of the typical examples of a priori propositions (in 
geometry, arithmetic and logic) which causes many thinkers to suppose that apriority 
involves necessity. I will attempt to reply to the question “Are the propositions in 
mathematics, geometry and logic (as the propositions which are typically believed to be 
examples of a priori proposition) necessarily true?” and suggest that if the propositions in 
geometry, arithmetic and logic are a priori propositions, they are not necessarily true1. 
According to the history of philosophy, apriority and necessity are closely related. All
the propositions in mathematics, geometry and logic, which are typically believed in being a 
priori proposition, seem to have a unique feature that a posteriori proposition does not have. 
That is, for example, 2 plus 2 is always equal 4, if P and Q is true then P is always true. On 
the other hand, a posteriori knowledge seems to be fallible. Thus, the feature of infallibility is
one of the reasons many thinkers believe that apriority involves necessity. However, there are
two reasons why I maintain that the propositions in mathematics, geometry and logic are not 
necessarily true:
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(1) There exist mathematical propositions which are recognized to be true but cannot
be proved to be true such as Goldbach’s conjecture. 
As Kripke argues in Naming and Necessity (1980), Goldbach’s conjecture causes 
us to finalize that a priority and necessity truth cannot be interchanged everywhere without 
changing their truth value of the propositions.
(2) There are many mathematical, geometrical and logical propositions which can be
both empirically and rationally defeasible. 
For instance, the propositions in Euclidian geometry, which are believed to be 
necessarily true, can be questioned and contested by non-Euclidian geometries. In the same 
way, logic, which seems to be necessarily true, can be questioned as well. This logic assumes 
that that there are only two truth-values: either true or false. But there are logics which claim 
that there are more than two truth-values such as fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic describes that there 
exist truth values which are between completely true and completely false since what 
happens in our world is not totally certain. Moreover, there are the paradoxes in mathematics,
such as Russell’s paradox in set theory2. These have suggested that all a priori propositions 
can be both empirically and rationally defeasible, so they are not necessarily true 
propositions.  
It may be noted, however, that the propositions in mathematics, geometry and logic 
have a crucial feature which cannot be neglected. That is, their theorems are logical 
consequences of the rules, such as the definitions and the postulates, in the system. Since the 
theorems are the logical consequences of what are previously accepted, it seems that we can 
prove all the theorems in the system if we know the propositions which are previously 
accepted. However, I suggest that the above proposal can be totally disputed by Gödel’s 
Incompleteness’s theorems, which claim that a formal system cannot be both complete and 
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consistent at the same time. That is, in any consistent formalization of mathematics, one can 
construct a statement that can be neither proved nor disproved within that system. And also, 
no consistent system can be used to prove its own consistency. In a complete mathematical 
system, there is at least one proposition which cannot be proved within the system, or there is
at least one proposition which is conceded without proving. When there is at least a 
proposition which cannot be proved in the system, it means that there is at least one 
proposition we cannot know whether it is a priori justified or not. Thus, we cannot declare 
that all of mathematics, geometry and logic are a priori justified. Nevertheless, it can be said 
that, most of the propositions in mathematics, geometry and logic seem to have some forms 
of necessity, which I call “conditional necessity”. Conditionally necessary propositions are 
propositions whose necessity depends on some prior conditions. For example, the theorems in
mathematics are necessarily true depending on the postulates, axioms and definitions which 
are formerly accepted. If the conditions are true, then their consequences are always logically 
true. However, the conditional necessity is not the same as “necessity” we discussed here. 
Thus, it cannot be a reason for concluding that apriority involves necessity. 
  To summarize, the propositions in mathematics, geometry, and logic (as the 
knowledge which are typically believed in being the example of a priori proposition) are not 
necessarily true. That is, they can be both empirically and rationally defeasible. Hence, if the 
propositions in mathematics geometry and logic are a priori propositions, they are not 
necessarily true. 
So far we have seen that the typical examples of necessary a posteriori proposition are
suspect, however, there are contingent a priori propositions. The existence of such 
propositions maintains that all a priori propositions need not be necessarily true. Therefore, 
apriority does not involve necessity.  
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III
In this section, I wish to consider two objections to my argument. The first objection 
is concerning the meaning of apriority and the meaning of necessity.  It seems that my 
meaning regarding "a priori knowledge" and "necessary truth" in this article is different from 
what traditional philosophers such as Kant mean. Therefore, it can be doubted whether my 
argument can actually reject the traditional arguments. The second objection is regarding the 
typical idea of a priori knowledge. That is, we have become accustomed to the idea that a 
priori knowledge is knowledge whose justification does not depend on experience, but, if a 
priori propositions are propositions whose justification does not depend on experience, why 
is it that experience can defeat a priori propositions?
First of all, it may be charged that my definition regarding the concept of necessity in 
this article is different from what traditional philosophers mean, especially Kant, thus, it can 
be claimed that my argument cannot reject the tradition argument, and I cannot sum up that 
all a priori propositions need not be necessarily true. According to Kant, all a priori 
knowledge is necessarily true. Furthermore, his “reality” is not the same as the other thinkers’
reality. For Kant, it is vital always to distinguish between the distinct realms of phenomena 
and noumena. Phenomena are the appearances, which constitute the world as we experience 
it; noumena are the (presumed) things-in-themselves, which constitute reality. Kant describes
that noumena are unknowable, indescribable realities that, in some way, lie "behind" 
observed phenomena. Human beings cannot, according to Kant, know things-in-themselves; 
we can only know things as we experience them. Thus, it seems that my argument (which is 
based on Kripke’s concept, which does not distinguish between noumena and phenomena, 
and defines necessity by the concept of possible worlds) apparently conflicts with Kant’s 
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account. That is, what I mean by “necessity” is not the same as what traditional philosophers 
mean, so I cannot really deny Kant’s argument. 
Nevertheless, even as my argument is based upon a meaning that is different from 
Kant, it is still viable, for I claim that Kant’s meaning of necessity is greatly problematic. 
According to Kant, human beings cannot know things-in-themselves; we can only know 
things as we experience them. Thus, Kant’s meaning of necessity is not the necessity of 
things-in-themselves, but of things as appear to us. However, when Kant’s necessity is the 
necessity of things as they appear to us, it can be possible that what appears to us is relative 
depending on different persons, different times and different places. For instance, if we 
compare Newton’s worldview and Einstein’s worldview, we can see that both worldviews are
different and rely on different geometrical systems. The general acceptance of Newton’s 
theory led Kant to accept Euclidian geometry as necessarily true. But it would then follow 
that the general acceptance of Einstein’s theory that Riemann geometry is necessarily true. 
Nevertheless, the theorems in the two geometrical systems cannot be both necessarily true for
they will conflict each other. At this point, Kant’s concept of necessity is self-defeating. 
Although my definitions differ from Kant’s, it can be said that this is a viable approach in 
trying to solve the problems which are raised after Kant’s argument about a priori knowledge.
Then, one may also be tempted to question that if a priori proposition is a proposition 
whose justification does not depend on experience, how experience can defeat a priori 
proposition?3 
According to this objection, I maintain that if the characterization of a priori 
justification is changed to be positive, the above question cannot be asked. That is, the 
general character of a priori justification is deficient in some respect, and the only remedy for
the deficiency is to embrace the positive characterization of a priori justification which 
characterizes it in terms of the sources on which it does depend, and abandon the negative 
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characterization of a priori justification which characterizes a priori knowledge in terms of 
the sources on which it does not depend. The structure of negative and positive 
characterization is as follows: 
Negative Characterization: S’ belief that P is justified a priori if and only if S’s 
justification for the belief that P does not depend on experience. 
Positive Characterization: S’s belief that P is justified a priori if and only if S’s 
justification for the belief that P depends on some nonexperiential source. (Or S’s belief that 
P is justified a priori if and only if S’s belief that P is justified by X)
Then, as a result of the feature of a priori proposition which is both empirically and 
rationally defeasible, I suggest that, to cohere with what I said earlier about apriority and 
necessity, a priori justification has to be positively characterized, namely, S’s belief that P is 
justified a priori if and only if S’s justification for the belief that P depends on some 
nonexperiential source. This solution does not cause us to question why experience can defeat
a priori proposition, whereas a priori proposition is a proposition whose justification does not 
depend on experience. That is, when we consider a posteriori proposition which generally 
means a proposition whose justification “depends on” experience, the proposition does not 
imply that it “cannot be both experientially and nonexperientially defeated”.  Then, in the 
same way, if a priori proposition means the proposition whose justification “depends on” 
some nonexperiential source, the proposition does not imply that it cannot be both 
experientially and nonexperientially defeated as well.
So far I have concluded that our customary ideas concerning a priori knowledge is not
accurate. That is, a priori knowledge is not the knowledge whose justification does not 
depend on experience, but is the knowledge whose justification depends on some 
nonexperiential source. This positive characterization of a priori justification can competently
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deal with the second objection which questions why a priori proposition can be experientially
defeated, whereas a priori proposition is a proposition whose justification does not depend on
experience.  
IV
 From what has been said so far it follows that there exists contingent a priori 
propositions. The existence of such propositions supports that apriority does not involve 
necessity. Moreover, as a priori propositions are both empirically and rationally defeasible, a 
priori justification has to be positively characterized in terms of the sources on which it does 
depend, namely, S’s belief that P is justified a priori if and only if S’s justification is that P 
depends on some nonexperiential source.
As I concluded in the last two sections, apriority does not involve necessity. 
Therefore, the crucial implication is that refuting the concept of necessity is not a good 
ground for refuting apriority.  That is, whether or not we reject the concept of necessity, it 
does not have any effect on the status of apriority. 
1
 The reason why I have to conclude in the form of “if … then” is mathematics, geometry 
and logic can be considered in two ways. Firstly, we can say of mathematics, geometry and logic as 
a system whose propositions correspond to the things in our actual world. Thus, the propositions in 
the system are experientially justified. Secondly, we can say of mathematics, geometry and logic as 
a system whose propositions do not relate to the things in our actual world. Without confirming that
the propositions in the system can reflect the things in our actual world, such proposition depends 
on some non-experiential source. Since mathematics, geometry and logic can be considered in two 
ways, if I sum up that all propositions in geometry, arithmetic and logic are not necessary a priori 
propositions, it will be objected that we can say of mathematics, geometry and logic as a system 
whose propositions correspond to the things in our actual world. To avoid such an objection, 
therefore, I conclude my argument in the form of “if ... then” which do not actually confirm that all 
propositions in geometry, arithmetic and logic are contingent “a priori” propositions.   
2
 Furthermore, the paradoxes which are not in mathematics can also cause us to question 
why all of a priori propositions are necessarily true, such as the sorites paradox. 
3
 The objection may be a result of Kant’s argument which claims that a priori knowledge is 
knowledge entirely independent of experience. When Kant states that a priori knowledge is 
knowledge “entirely independent of experience”, it seems that experience cannot both justify and 
defeat any a priori knowledge.
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